The present paper argues that 'mature mathematical formalisms' play a central role in achieving representation via scientic models. A close discussion of two contemporary accounts of how mathematical models apply -the DDI account (according to which representation depends on the successful interplay of denotation, demonstration and interpretation) and the 'matching model' account reveals shortcomings of each, which, it is argued, suggests that scientic representation may be ineliminably heterogeneous in character. In order to achieve a degree of unication that is compatible with successful representation, scientists often rely on the existence of a 'mature mathematical formalism', where the latter refers to a mathematically formulated and physically interpreted notational system of locally applicable rules that derive from (but need not be reducible to) fundamental theory. As mathematical formalisms undergo a process of elaboration, enrichment, and entrenchment, they come to embody theoretical, ontological, and methodological commitments and assumptions. Since these are enshrined in the formalism itself, they are no longer readily obvious to either the novice or the procient user. At the same time as formalisms constrain what may be represented, they also function as inferential and interpretative resources.
Introduction
Idealization, abstraction, and approximation have long been at the heart of much of the physical sciences, and the deliberate construction of scientic models has an only slightly shorter history. And yet there is a sense that the systematic and pervasive deployment of scientic modelling techniques is a fairly recent phenomenon; in some disciplines especially those that deal with complex systems scientic models have become the default mode of how to approach scientic problems. As Adam Morton puts it,`what is new and distinctive in the science of our time is the existence of complex mediating models which themselves have explanatory power and which embody techniques of modelling which can be rened and passed down to successor models, even though the models never themselves can function as background theories' [Morton 1993, p. 664] . In the present paper, I focus on the role of mathematics in this process; in particular, I shall argue that`mature mathematical formalisms' embody inferential strategies and theoretical commitments that contribute to, and sometimes ensure, the representational success of scientic models.
In the philosophical literature, the success of models continues, for better or worse, to be discussed in representational terms: in short, scientic models represent, and successful models represent successfully. In the present paper, I
do not attempt to explain what scientic representation is in general. Instead, I focus on how mathematical models represent reality. In particular, I want to argue for a positive role of mathematical formalisms in achieving representation. The notion of`mathematical formalism' calls for some clarication. As I understand the term, a mature mathematical formalism is a system of rules and conventions that deploys (and often adds to) the symbolic language of mathematics; it typically encompasses locally applicable rules for the manipulation of its notation, where these rules are derived from, or otherwise systematically connected to, certain theoretical or methodological commitments. As a result, a mature mathematical formalism is imbued with, but not usually reducible to, what Nancy Cartwright has called`fundamental theory' (where the latter aims at a complete account solely in terms of fundamental laws; see [Cartwright 1983, p . 1]). A given mathematical formalism need neither be unique nor complete (in whatever sense of uniqueness or completeness), though its amenability to a wide range of representational tasks will, of course, count in its favour. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is perhaps worth pointing out that, as I understand the term,`mathematical formalism' does not refer to (nor entail any preference with respect to) any particular debate or position within the philosophy of mathematics; my concern in this paper is with how scientists deploy (physically interpreted) mathematical formalisms as inferential and interpretative strategies.
The present paper can be thought of as divided into two parts, Sections 1-3 and Section 4. The rst three sections are devoted to a close analysis of the challenges and problems faced by contemporary accounts of scientic representation, especially in relation to mathematical models. Section 4, which makes up roughly the second half of the paper, develops in detail my view that mature mathematical formalisms in science function as inferential practices and interpretative resources and play an essential role in achieving representation.
2
Recent accounts of how models apply
In the present section, I discuss two recent accounts of how mathematical models represent, each of which is indicative of a certain conception of how mathematical models apply to the world. On the rst account, a mathematical model as stated, say, in the form of a set of equations represents a target system indirectly, via an intermediate`matching model' that is posited as isomorphic to the target system. The representational power of a given mathematical model thus resides in its overall ability to`map' more or less idealised physical situations. The second approach takes as primary the observation that mathematical modelling is a theoretical process that involves dierent component steps; representation, on this account, is to be understood as the joint outcome of dierent contributing factors that are by and large on a par with one another.
Derivation and matching models
One strand of the philosophical debate about mathematical models has developed from the perceived indispensability of mathematical entities in scientic explanation. Many explanations, especially in physics, appear to be based essentially on mathematical features, rather than on an appeal to causal factors, which are often abstracted away or otherwise discounted. Philosophers of mathematics have sometimes appealed to nature's apparent amenability to mathematical representation, and to the explanatory power of mathematics, as evidence for Platonism about mathematical entities. For philosophers of science, too, our far-reaching reliance on mathematics as a means for representation and scientic explanations, raises important questions: How do mathematical models represent the world, and how can we hope to gain understanding of the physical world by deploying such models? In the present section, I shall take as my starting point one recent philosophical proposal, due to Christopher Pincock, regarding the question of how mathematical models apply to the world.
I shall follow Pincock by beginning with a concrete example, the partial dierential equation known as the one-dimensional heat equation, which is used to represent the heat ow along one direction of a material with thermal conductivity κ, density ρ, and specic heat s. The temperature distribution u(x, t) at point x and time t may then be described by the partial dierential equation κ ρs 2 ∂ 2 ∂x 2 u(x, t) = ∂ ∂t u(x, t).
(1)
Whenever we apply a particular equation to a physical phenomenon, we can inquire into (1) the equation's relation to the theory that is presumed to cover the phenomenon in question, and (2) scientists warranted in using this equation to describe a particular physical system?' [Pincock 2005, p . 68] The former question, in Pincock's terminology, constitutes a search for derivation conditions, while the latter question calls for the specication of application conditions. Let us turn to the problem of derivation conditions rst, with the caveat that the specic conditions and assumptions that feature in the context of a derivation will, of course, vary from one example to another. Given that the mathematical details of the derivation of the 1-D heat equation are discussed in Pincock's case study, I shall conne myself to pointing out some of the derivation's general features, especially those that illustrate the kinds of questions that arise from the demand for derivation conditions.
In deriving the equations that are constitutive of a mathematical model, one may, for example, start from empirically established regularities that hold across a wide range of experimental data.
1 Such regularities are sometimes invoked as phenomenological laws, as, for example, in Hooke's law of applied mechanics.
In the case of the heat equation, the relevant phenomenological law is Newton's law of cooling, according to which the rate of heat loss of one body to another is proportional to the dierence in temperature between them. The regularities that phenomenological laws describe typically do not hold universally: Hooke's law, which describes the linear elongation of a body (e.g., a metal spring) under an external force (e.g., a weight attached to the spring), is violated once the external force becomes too strong; Newton's law of cooling, which entails that a macroscopic object is cooled most eectively by placing it in a heat bath with minimal (ideally: zero) temperature, neither holds for microscopic systems governed by quantum mechanics, nor for non-classical cooling methods such as thermal annealing. (See ref. [Tarnow 1994 ].) Such limitations and exceptions are one reason why phenomenological laws are not themselves considered part of fundamental theory, even if, in some cases, phenomenological laws may be derived often retrospectively as limiting cases of more fundamental laws. In speaking of phenomenological`laws', as well as in formulating them in terms of such quantities as the (momentary)`rate of heat loss', one is already, strictly speaking, extrapolating beyond the empirical ndings: any experiment, however elaborately carried out, can only ever measure the nite amount of heat that is transferred over a non-zero period of time, not the momentary rate of heat loss at a given instant.
This distinction between the`coarse-grained' character of the experimental data (consisting of measurements of nite dierences ∆x 1 , ∆x 2 , ...) and the`innitesimal' character of Newton's law, is more than mere hairsplitting.
Rather, it points to an important aspect of mathematical modelling, especially where this involves deriving dierential equations such as the 1-D heat equation. In virtually all such derivations, a transition from dierence equations 1 Other background assumptions will, of course, need to be added as well; this includes certain prescriptions and conventions regarding the interpretation of the equations.
to dierential equations requires a limiting procedure, such as taking the limit ∆x → 0, thereby replacing measurable dierences with unobservable innitesimal changes. Their ubiquity across so many areas of science should not belie the fact that such limiting procedures raise some very fundamental problems.
Apart from the mathematical question of whether the limiting procedure successfully converges or not, there is the fundamental worry that such limiting procedures may cast doubt on whatever representational signicance the quantities in question might have had in the rst place. Consider the example of the 1-D heat equation. Deriving the partial dierential equation, in its form given in equation (1) above, requires, amongst other steps, evaluating the heat loss across an innitesimal distance ∆x in the limit ∆x → 0. However, given the (undisputed) atomic constitution of matter, and a further fundamental tenet of the theory of heat namely that heat is simply the average kinetic energy of the constituent atoms taking the limit ∆x → 0 would quickly become meaningless: there is no such thing as the heat at a given point in space, only the heat in a region of space that is large enough to actually accommodate an ensemble of atoms. Yet, for the mathematical derivation of the heat equation it is crucial that it be possible to take the limit stopping at some nite minimum length ∆x > 0 will not do. The problem, then, appears to be this: in deriving the heat equation an equation which purports to describe the physical phenomenon of heat conduction we start from an empirically measurable relationship (the proportionality between any nite amount of heat transferred and the temperature dierence between two objects), yet we are forced to introduce quantities and employ limiting procedures which no experiment would lead us to think are well-dened. As Pincock puts it, we have here`an apparent gap between our evidence for the premises of the derivation and the assumptions needed to warrant the steps of the derivation.' [Pincock 2005, p. 70] How, then, can one justify placing trust in such derivations as are illustrated by the heat equation? One option would be to assess the nal result of the derivation in this case, the heat equation simply on its own terms, by its empirical performance or its predictive success. However, such an instrumentalist approach would make the success of our derivations, if not a miracle, then certainly a mystery. Derivations play an important part as aides to our understanding of mathematical models and to the resolution of interpretative problems; dismissing the value of actual derivations in favour of brute instrumental success would at the very least be premature. A less radical approach might acknowledge the relevance of the derivation, but regard the latter as a primarily mathematical exercise, which need not lend itself to a physical interpretation at every step. This, in eect, is the position advocated by Pincock, who holds that in deriving mathematical models, we typically move back and forth between a physical attitude `which insists that throughout we are talking about physical systems and physical magnitudes' [Pincock 2005, p . 70] and a mathematical attitude, which views such steps as taking the`unphysical' limit ∆x → 0 as`involving only mathematical objects' (in this case, innitesimals).
Each attitude alone typically does not suce: from the perspective of the physical attitude, many steps of a derivation will strictly speaking be false simply because the idealisations and approximations employed are known to be just that: idealisations and approximations, rather than true representations of the full state of aairs whereas adopting a thoroughgoing mathematical attitude would sever the link that connects the derived model equation to the physical system, or phenomenon, which it is supposed to describe.
The claim that derivations of model equations involve two, prima facie incompatible attitudes, is not intended as a merely descriptive claim about scientic practice. The point is not that some scientists lean more towards one attitude rather than the other, or that there is perpetual vacillation between the two; instead, both are essential components of any complete account of mathematical modelling, and each contributes in distinct ways to the representational capacity of mathematical models. Whether or not a model represents a physical system, or phenomenon, cannot be a question of whether or not it accurately mirrors every single detail; such a criterion would be far too strong, not only because it could hardly ever be met (except in the most simplistic and uninteresting cases), but also because many phenomena for example in thermodynamics are quite robust with respect to minor variations (e.g., among microstates).
Some degree of idealisation and approximation is thus entirely legitimate, yet, for the reasons described earlier, these are also likely to give rise to steps in the derivation that are incompatible with the physical attitude. At the same time, some approximations or idealisations, while mathematically admissible, may simply be too crude, thereby undermining the representational capacity of the resulting equations. What is needed, then, is a framework which not only accommodates both attitudes in such a way as to assign each its proper place, but which also recognises that both are indispensable the physical attitude for giving empirical content to what would otherwise be a bare mathematical structure, and the mathematical attitude for ensuring the validity of the intermediate derivational steps.
Pincock attempts to develop such a framework by making mathematical modelling that is, the successful derivation of model equations that represent a physical system a two-step process. Given that model equations are typically the outcome of idealisation and abstraction, any attempt to imbue them with representational content retrospectively, in a way that does not respect how they were derived, would seem arbitrary, at best loosely aimed at lling in details that may have been lost in the course of the derivation. Instead of trying to vindicate representation on the basis of a set of (post-derivation) equations, one might look for a more direct criterion for when a model has the potential to represent. One criterion that might make representation seem inevitable, would be the existence of an isomorphism between the model and the physical system or phenomenon it is supposed to represent.
2 Under this condition, so one might argue, a model would not only represent, it would also represent truly. (On this 2 On closer inspection, however, isomorphism at least in its naive form suers from numerous problems, not least its inability to make sense of the asymmetry of the representation relation: after all, a successful model represents its target system, not vice versa. (On this point, see [Suárez 2003, p. 232f.] .) For a discussion of more elaborate proposals in the same vein as isomorphism, see the second half of Section 4.3.
point, see [Pincock 2005b ].) However, a model that has been derived via a series of idealisations and approximations will typically not be isomorphic to any real system. In order to nonetheless save the idea that`representation must involve an isomorphism between some mathematical model and the physical situation represented', Pincock suggests`that the model described in the derivation (the derivation model) be distinct from the model that is isomorphic to the physical situation (the matching model)'. [Pincock 2005, p 4 Here, it suces to note that, at the very least, the distinction between two kinds of models, M M and M D , provides a possible way of reconciling the two competing demands posed by the physical and the mathematical attitude, respectively: to provide a representation of reality, and to do so in a mathematically accessible way.
Denotation, demonstration, and interpretation
An alternative way of approaching the question of how models represent would begin not from the question of how mathematics applies to the world, but from an attempt to analyse the process of mathematical modelling. One such account, to be discussed here, has been proposed by R.I.G. Hughes (1997 individually necessary and jointly sucient for an act of theoretical representation to take place'. [Hughes 1996, p. 329] Rather, he makes`the more modest suggestion that, if we examine a theoretical model with these three activities in mind, we shall achieve some insight into the kind of representation it provides' (ibid.). It therefore makes sense to analyse which central aspect of theoretical models each of the components brings out.
At the heart of the DDI account is the idea of denotation, which Hughes borrows from Nelson Goodman's work on representation in aesthetics, especially his Languages of Art (1976 To the extent that theoretical elements denote real features of the world, the relation they bear to those features is, in a phrase endorsed by Hughes (and borrowed from Duhem),`only the relation of sign to the thing signied' [Hughes 1996, p. 330] . Some critics have attacked the DDI account for precisely this reason; they argue that`the notion of denotation seems to imply that the relation between model and target is purely arbitrary' [Ducheyne 2006, p. 216] . This criticism, however, misses the mark. To be sure, denotation may be arbitrary and merely stipulative, but it need not be. In the case of theoretical models, denotation will more often than not be guided by background assumptions and theoretical frameworks, as model-building is typically part of a larger project of inquiry. This naturally imposes limits on the degree to which denotation can be arbitrarily stipulated. Furthermore, the criticism overlooks that, according to the DDI account, it is the triad of denotation, demonstration, and interpretation, rather than denotation alone, which jointly establishes representation. By following Goodman's original advice that`we must examine the characteristics of representation as a special kind of denotation' [Goodman 1976, p. 5] , the DDI account does not simply equate denotation and representation.
Rather, the idea is that, in order for representation to be attained, denotation must be put to the test by successful demonstration and interpretation.
Some degree of arbitrariness in denotation is not only to be expected, but may even be considered necessary for the purpose of model-building. Devising a theoretical model requires selecting the relevant characteristics of a physical system, and judgments of relevance may vary depending on explanatory context.
Hence, unless one is committed to the uniqueness of theoretical models i.e., the implausible view that, for any given physical system, there can only ever be one theoretical model that truly represents it some freedom in choosing how to denote elements in the world is clearly desirable. This is not to say that denotation is always successful, in the sense that it always succeeds in picking out those elements which are explanatorily relevant, thereby imbuing the model with representational signicance. It would indeed be miraculous if the success of denotation were guaranteed in this way. But this is not what the DDI account claims. The point is not that representation can somehow be established by mere stipulation, but rather that denotation provides a tentative, prima facie connection with the world, which may then be vindicated in the course of further demonstration and interpretation.
Of the three components of the DDI account, demonstration is perhaps the least problematic, since, in the case of mathematical models, it can largely be equated with the use of mathematical derivation techniques. While such techniques may have their own practical and conceptual problems, they do not directly touch upon the question of how theoretical models represent a reality external to it; demonstration, to paraphrase Hughes, takes place entirely within the model in its mathematical formulation. Nonetheless, demonstration is essential, both insofar as it allows for the derivation of results and predictions from a model, and because it makes salient that a mathematical model, by virtue of its being a mathematical object, has an internal dynamic. For Hughes, this insight is fundamental to the use of models in physics in general:
To be predictive, a science must provide representations that have a dynamic of this kind built into them. That is one reason why mathematical models are the norm in physics. Their internal dynamic is supplied, at least in part, by the deductive resources of the mathematics they employ. [Hughes 1996, p Interpretation is, of course, no simple aair, as it may require considerable ingenuity and imagination. In the case of a mathematical model, even when a result has been successfully derived within the formalism of the model equations, its empirical interpretation may not always be self-evident. As an example, consider the case of mathematical divergencies: if one or more of a model's variables diverge for certain parameter values, the interpreter may be faced with the choice of either dismissing it as an`unphysical' result for example because the corresponding physical magnitude is recognised as necessarily nite for any nite physical system under consideration or interpreting it as an indicator of a real feature in the world (e.g., a phase transition), though perhaps one that the model is unable to capture (e.g., a phase transition). Just as in the`inverse' case of denotation, some degree of arbitrariness is thus to be expected, perhaps even inevitable. Interpretation, however does not operate in a vacuum: just like denotation, it will be constrained by a range of commitments, presuppositions, and background assumptions. Some such constraints may be explicitly built into the model, others may simply be part of the theoretical framework that underlies the model. fundamentally representational relationship, is thus not a matter of denotation alone.
Denotational indeterminacy
As an illustration of the sort of problem that aicts the idea of denotation as the ultimate source of representational force, let us consider the following example, which I borrow from Suárez (2004) . Suppose that one wishes to represent the movement of two ships on the sea in the form of a physical model, using simple ingredients such as two pens and two pieces of paper. Intuitively, this task seems easy enough: one need only stipulate, through an act of denotation, that the paper represent the sea, and that the two pens represent the ships. Once the denotational relationship has been xed, one can then go ahead and draw a number of (though, given the model's simplicity, perhaps not very many) correct inferences`about the ship-on-sea system on the basis of a consideration of the pens-on-paper system, such as, for instance, that the trajectories of the ships may cross and that they may crash' [Suárez 2004, p. 772] . This much seems uncontroversial and quite straightforward, perhaps even trivial. However, given that denotation is explicitly construed as an alternative to global criteria such as similarity and isomorphy, there would appear to be no constraint that would stop us from inverting the denotational arrangement that is, let the pieces of paper represent the ships, and the pens the sea even though this choice would seem counterintuitive, to say the least. As Suárez observes,`it seems so because it is less informative, since the relative movements of pens and paper can not allow us, for instance, to infer the possibility that the two ships may crash' [Suárez 2004, p. 772] . Denotation, and the multiplicity of denotational arrangements it entails, thus appear to give rise to a form of denotational indeterminacy. This suggests that whether or not a model A successfully represents a state of aairs B is at least in part determined by A's inferential utility, where the latter is the degree to which`A allows competent and informed agents to draw specic inferences regarding B' [Suárez 2004, p. 773] . It also suggests that, without inferential utility as a constraint on model-construction, denotation may fall foul of problems of indeterminacy.
One might worry whether the indeterminacy of denotation and the resulting ambiguity of denotational arrangements are all that signicant. Surely, one might argue,`unnatural' denotational arrangements such as the paper's (instead of the pens') representing the ships in the pens-and-paper model can easily be ruled out on the basis of simple criteria, such as similarity, which do not require deployment of the full inferential apparatus. While some basic recognitional capacity is needed in order to recognise a at piece of paper as more similar to the sea's surface than a compact pointed object such as a pen, such a capacity hardly requires much in terms of the active drawing of inferences. It is, after all, what children do intuitively when they play`battleships' using pen (or pencil marks) and paper! 7 However, such a response to the worry 7 Responses on the basis of psychological experience, including subjective assessments of about denotational indeterminacy would be inadequate. While it may be the case that simple physical models, such as the pens-on-paper model, do not pose serious denotational problems, the problem of denotational indeterminacy cuts much deeper. There are good reasons to think that the problem will become more pertinent as the level of abstraction increases, not least because simple criteria such as similarity quickly lose their applicability.
Denotation and scientic realism: an example
In order to drive home the point about the reality of worries about denotational ambiguity, let us digress briey and consider a concrete example from physics, specically the case of`quasi-particles' in condensed matter physics.
When modelling solid state systems (e.g., metals), one often represents the collective behaviour of correlated electrons in terms of the so-called Fermi sphere.
In accordance with fundamental constraints such as the Pauli exclusion principle, correlated electrons in a solid can only occupy certain (mutually exclusive) energy states. If a certain single-particle state is fully occupied, a new electron that is added to the system must occupy the next-highest energy state that is available. In a system of many electrons, for example a solid with of the order of 10 23 particles, a large number of neighbouring states will thus be occupied.
Given that, in so-called reciprocal (k-) space, the energy E k of an electron varies with the distance of a particle's state ( k, σ) from the origin (k = 0), the visual model that is typically invoked is that of a sphere containing all occupied electron states, centered around the single-particle ground state k = 0. At zero temperature, when the system occupies the many-body ground state of lowest total energy, this Fermi sphere is clearly dened, in that it has a sharply dened surface, all occupied states inside, none outside. In the presence of interactions and uctuations, however in other words, when the system is at nite (nonzero) temperature the sphere will be deformed, and some electrons will be excited into states outside the original sphere, leaving behind an unoccupied state inside.
Due to the strong correlations that exist between the constituent electrons in a solid, various disturbances and excitations from the ground state can give rise to a range of collective responses of the system, perhaps the most important of which are instances of quasi-particle behaviour. Such behaviour is characterised by the (chimerical) appearance of`new' particles, which appear to have measurable properties such as a virtual`eective mass', average life-time, electric charge, and so forth. These so-called quasi-particles behave just like`normal'
particles across a wide range of measurements and experiments, and their eects can be reproduced experimentally in a robust and reliable manner. For example, removing an electron from the system, and with it its negative electrical charge, inferential utility, can only go so far. As I shall suggest in the next section, a more fruitful place to look for constraints on denotational arrangements would be in their material or formal characteristics, insofar as these embody certain inferential strategies and theoretical commitments. As I will claim in Section 4, this is one of the features that make mature mathematical formalisms a powerful representational resource.
would appear to leave an`electron hole' behind which may then`act' as a positively charged quasi-particle, and as such may, for example, form bound states with other electrons (forming so-called`excitons'). However, the existence of such quasi-particles is illusory, insofar as quasi-particles are mere artefacts of the collective behaviour of the correlated many-electron system: their apparent properties and eects do not have independent reality, but are simply functions of the total many-electron system. (See [Gelfert 2003 ], for a detailed argument to this eect; and [Falkenburg 2007 ] for a diering view.) This is most obvious in the case of an electron hole, whose causally relevant features are simply due to the absence of an electron, and not the result of the coming into existence of an independent new kind of entity; the same applies, by extension, to other quasi-particles. It must therefore be conceded that a quasi-particle, just like an absence, to paraphrase David Lewis,`is nothing relevant at all, and therefore cannot furnish causal relata' [Lewis 2004, p. 282] . While this is not the place to explore the ramications, metaphysical and otherwise, of`quasi-entities' such as holes, absences, and quasi-particles, the example is nonetheless instructive with regard to the role of denotation, e.g. in ascertaining referential success. Denotation as the basis of representation has occasionally come under re for being a success term, e.g., for positing`a sharp dierence between a representation of a real object where the source denotes the target and a representation of a ctional object, which does not involve the denotation of what is purportedly represented' [Suárez 2004, p. 770] . Indeed, to mention just one critic of denotation, Suárez regards it as a crucial advantage of a thoroughgoing inferential conception of representation that, unlike a denotation-based account, it is capable of dealing with instances of ctional representation since ctional objects (say, the concept of a`unicorn') can, of course, feature in inferences, even if they do not correspond to any objects in the real world.
But even if denotation cannot account for all kinds of representation, such as those involving ctional objects, it may still turn out to be a central ingredient in scientic representation. For, more often than not, denotational success is a criterion of scientic success; while it is stipulative in the rst instance, it needs to prove its mettle in subsequent inquiry. The example of quasi-particle behaviour in a correlated system illustrates this point nicely: even though the collective behaviour of the system mimicks particle-like behaviour, the scientic challenge lies precisely in explaining how such emergent behaviour can arise from a system of simple constituents, without accepting a host of new (ctitious) quasi-entities as on a par with what we know, on independent grounds, to be the After all,`if the appropriate relationships are not in place between the relevant properties then the model will not be deemed scientic' [French 2003 [French , p. 1478 .
But this is a platitude, not a valid criticism: Of course, any attempt at representation, whether in art or science, will be subject to constraints, some of which are conventional in character, while others are due to the specic aesthetic or cognitive goals associated with the (artistic or scientic) representation in question. In the case of scientic representation, denotation needs to be constrained by demonstration and interpretation (as the DDI account suggests), as well as by other constraints (for example, the commitment to the referential success of central elements of a model, as in the quasi-particle case above). Given that scientic models serve cognitive goals, inferential utility, too, can act as a constraint on model-based representation. In other words, one should be careful not to overstate the antagonism that exists between denotation-based accounts of scientic representation on the one hand, and inferential accounts on the other hand. Both have their place in accounting for scientic representation, and may even be complementary. In much the same way that mere denotation may not be enough to establish representational force, one might argue that inferential utility alone, without a denotational basis, may not suce for the success of a model. A successful scientic model, I want to submit, is one that allows us to draw inferences and gain information about its target system, where the latter may be a specic physical system or itself a (generalised) class of phenomena.
The heterogeneous character of scientic representation
What inferential and denotational accounts have in common is their acknowledgment that model-based representation depends for its success on a variety of factors such as the cognitive goals of model-users, referential success, and interpretation which cannot easily be assimilated, e.g., to a purely structuralist account based on isomorphism. Structuralist accounts may well be adequate for a suitably narrow class of scientic models, perhaps comprising only those kinds of models where`messy' problems of interpretation and denotational indeterminacy no longer arise. In his discussion of the DDI account, Steven French asks:`One must also include some account of interpretation, but if one is going to do that, why bother with denotation to begin with? Why not return to an account based on isomorphism?' [French 2003 [French , p. 1479 Recognising that successful representation is typically the joint eect of an interplay of multiple factors, is necessary, not least in order to account for the diversity of actual scientic models. Most philosophical discussions of scientic models this paper included tend to focus on theoretical or mathematical models. However, just as it would be hasty to dismiss examples that cannot be assimilated to one's preferred (e.g., structuralist) account of representation, so it would be careless to dismiss a whole tradition of philosophical thinking about mechanical and material models, simply on the ground that such models are specied directly in their materials, rather than in their relation to theory. The denotational and inferential accounts of representation can be usefully applied to such material models, as has recently been argued by Davis Baird (2004 (1968) , manipulating the physical model became not just a convenient shortcut for theoretical reasoning based on empirical data, but an independent source of inferential utility:
8 It is again telling that some structuralist critics relegate denotation to, at best, the semantic realm of`how words represent' [French 2003 [French : 1478 i.e., of linguistic meaning thereby ignoring the manifestly denotational aspects of some of our non-linguistic ways of interacting with the world.
`The α-helix had not been found by only staring at X-ray pictures; the essential trick, instead, was to ask which atoms like to sit next to each other. In place of pencil and paper, the main working tools were a set of molecular models supercially resembling the toys of preschool children.' [Watson 1981, p. 34 It is deationary, insofar as it only aims to identify minimal requirements for representation, without assuming that these must take the form of necessary and sucient conditions, let alone be formulated in terms of isomorphism and similarity (see also [Suárez 2003 ]); and it is pragmatic, insofar as inferential utility varies across groups of`competent and informed agents', whose ability to draw valid inferences regarding B on the basis of reasoning about A is itself`a pragmatic skill that depends on the aim and context of the particular inquiry' [Suárez 2004, p. 773 ]. Suárez makes a convincing case that a universal`onesize-ts-all' account of scientic representation is likely to be an illusion, and limits himself to identifying at most two general necessary conditions representational force and inferential utility that need to be in place for scientic representation. What generates representation in each successful case, beyond the mere fulllment of these two necessary conditions, is not something that can be prejudged by abstract analysis:`In every specic context of inquiry, given a putative target and source, some stronger condition will typically be met; but which one specically will vary from case to case.' [Suárez 2004, p. 776] While I concur with Suárez that the search for a substantial account of scientic representation that is, an account in terms of universal necessary and sucient conditions for scientic representation is unlikely to succeed, I believe that many positive instances of representational success can nonetheless be explained, in a unied way, by identifying, across a range of specic cases, what it takes to achieve representation.
9 What gives unity to model-based representation as a successful scientic practice, I suggest, is not an abstract requirement (e.g., the presence of isomorphism, similarity, interpretation, etc.), but instead is a matter of general features of the process of model construction. In the remainder of this paper, I shall argue that, more often than not, the deployment of a mature mathematical formalism during the process of model construction and articulation, plays an important role in achieving the kind and degree of unication required for scientic representation.
Hesse on mathematical formalism
As the starting point of my defence of mathematical formalisms as a unicatory force, I shall draw on some of the early work on the philosophy of scientic models, in particular the work by Mary Hesse. While Hesse is best-known for her view of models as analogies [Hesse 1963 ], much of her work also contributes to an analysis of the role of mathematics in physics. Thus, in her 1953 paper Models in Physics', Hesse sets out to defend two theses, the second of which is the suggestion that`most physicists do not regard models as literal descriptions of nature, but as standing in a relation of analogy to nature' [Hesse 1953, p. 201; emphasis original] . It is her detailed defence of this second claim that sparked a long-lasting debate over the analogical character of models. Much less has been made of Hesse's rst claim, however, which asserts that`mathematical formalisms, when used as hypotheses in the description of physical phenomena, may function like the mechanical models of an earlier stage in physics, without having in themselves any mechanical or other physical interpretations' [Hesse 1953, p. 199 takes their place is provided by the nature of the mathematical formalism itself any particular piece of mathematics has its own ways of suggesting modication and generalisation; it is not an isolated collection of equations having no relation to anything else, but is a recognisable part of the whole structure of abstract mathematics, and this is true whether the symbols employed have any concrete physical interpretation or not. [Hesse 1953, p. 200] While I shall subsequently move beyond Hesse's account of mathematical formalism, I here wish to point to three elements of the above quote that strike me as especially instructive. First, Hesse credits mathematical formalism with providing`pointers towards further progress', similar to the way picturable mechanical models in the past have suggested new avenues of research to those who devised them. The tentative language is important here: picturable mechanical models as well as mathematical formalism point towards progress and suggest new steps of modication and generalisation, rather than making progress inevitable or entailing specic modications. At the same time this is the second point, which is at least implicitly present in the quote from Hesse mathematical formalism not merely accommodates whatever hypotheses one may already have about the system in question, but instead also constrains the ways in which a system can be represented. As a`particular piece of mathematics' each formalism`has its own ways of suggesting modication and generalisation' (ibid.; my emphasis); some modications may go beyond, or even`violate', the constraints that hold for a given formalism, without thereby being logically or mathematically non-permissible.
10 Note also that a mathematical formalism need not be identiable with any particular branch of mathematics as such;`formalisms', in the sense discussed here, will typically be more local than any branch of mathematics such as topology, number theory, algebra, etc. For the same reason, not just any application of mathematics to nature will count as employing a mathematical formalism; as Hesse indicates, a formalism will be`a recognisable part of the whole structure of abstract mathematics', not the totality of mathematics itself.
11 Finally, as a third observation in connection with Hesse's quote, I wish to emphasise the pragmatic dimension of mathematical formalism. A piece of mathematics, such as an interpreted set of equations in conjunction with rules and heuristics for their application, must be recognisable as such by the user; its value lies in its utility to the user, for example in the extent to which it enables the user to derive empirical results or to pursue those modications and generalisations that Hesse identies as`pointers towards further progress'.
Mathematical formalisms vs. mathematical techniques and formal frameworks
In order to gain a better understanding of the signicance of mathematical formalisms in model-based science, I shall contrast what I take to be three main heuristic uses of mathematics in scientic inquiry. Each of the three has its own distinctive way of shaping the future course of inquiry, either by shaping its immediate goals or by constraining its possible outcomes. While there may be some borderline cases that cannot be classied unambiguously, I believe that, in most cases of actual scientic practice, it will be suciently clear which of the three categories an instance of applying mathematics belongs to. As labels for these categories, I suggest a trichotomy consisting of the terms`mathematical techniques',`formal frameworks', and`mathematical formalisms'. I shall briey describe each category, characterise its role in scientic inquiry, and illustrate its signicance on the basis of an example. 12 Tarja Knuuttila, in her contribution to this volume, links the`results-orientedness' of much of scientic modelling to the`concrete manipulability' of models.
will be necessary in order to make clear what element of scientic practice the term is supposed to capture. To this end, it will be useful to begin by drawing a few contrasts. Whereas mathematical techniques are typically tailored to specic empirical contexts, formal frameworks are usually established in a morè global' way, without much regard for the details of any particular empirical situation. Also, whereas the choice of mathematical techniques often takes place well into the process of inquiry for example, when it turns out that a derivation from`rst principles' is too complex and that numerical approximations need to be made the choice of a formal framework often precedes the formulation of more specic problems, which may subsequently be tackled. except their symmetry properties' [Weyl 1928, p. 181 ], Weyl proceeded to give an account in terms of symmetry properties`independently of the dynamical structure of the physical system under consideration' [Weyl 1968, p. 276] . The very fact that this approach was neither tailored to specic empirical cases nor directly entailed by the known dynamical laws of quantum theory, came to be seen as an advantage: Group theory, according to Weyl, revealed`the essential features which are not contingent on a special form of the dynamical laws nor on special considerations concerning the forces involved' [Weyl 1928, p. xxi] . Its very independence from perhaps even disregard for specic empirical detail, along with an at best loose relationship to what was known about fundamental theory at the time, allowed group theory to function as a formal framework for atomic physics and, later, nuclear physics, where the pursuit of symmetry relations (for example via the standard model of elementary particles) became a guiding principle of theorising.
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The two uses of mathematics distinguished thus far as, on the one hand, a set of techniques for the`local' generation of specic results and, on the other hand, a formal framework for physical theorising dene dierent ends of a spectrum of deploying mathematics in scientic inquiry. I now wish to turn to a third mode of using mathematics in science, which occupies a middle position between the two extremes outlined above, but which at the same time has characteristic features that cannot be reduced to an admixture of elements from either mathematical techniques or formal frameworks. I shall refer to this use of mathematics in science as the deployment of a mathematical formalism. As with the two previous cases, some care must be taken to give a specic meaning to the term`mathematical formalism'.`Mathematical formalism', in the present context, is to be understood as a physically interpreted formalism, i.e. as more than merely the deployment of the formal language of mathematics. It must be suciently general to be applicable to a range of physical problems; at the same time, it will typically fall short of universality, in the sense that certain cases though logically and physically permissible nonetheless do not lend themselves to the application of the formalism. It thus follows that a mathematical formalism will typically include rules and heuristic assumptions that are not themselves part of either the mathematical framework or entailed by the`underlying' fundamental theory.
The general features mentioned so far are inferred from the assumption that mathematical formalisms inhabit a middle ground between outcome-oriented mathematical techniques and formal mathematical frameworks. What needs to be shown is that such a middle ground does indeed exist, and this can be done by way of example. In the remainder of this subsection, I wish to discuss in some detail what I take to be a good example of a mature mathematical formalism in physics, in the sense that has been discussed so far. The example I have in mind is the formalism of creation and annihilation operators in quantum manybody physics. I shall rst give a theoretical justication (or rather: motivation) for this formalism, before giving examples of how it is deployed in practice.
However, it is worth emphasising beforehand that the mere possibility of giving a theoretical justication for a given formalism does not entail that any particular application of that formalism is best understood as a`direct' application of fundamental theory to a specic problem. A mature formalism will typically be set up in such a way that its output will`automatically' satisfy certain theoretical desiderata; at the same time, there may be certain theoretically permissible situations or scenarios that cannot be adequately represented using the formalism in question. A formalism, one might say in a turn of phrase that has usually been reserved for scientic models, mediates between theoretical rst principles' and descriptions of empirical situations in their full complexity.
With this caveat in mind, I shall turn to a description of the formalism of creation and annihilation operators and their place in the quantum physics of many-body systems. While the formalism of second quantization is typically associated with quantum eld theory, for example in high-energy physics, its analogue in the case of quantum many-body systems has received far less attention in the philosophical literature. The use of creation and annihilation operators is an attempt to extend the formalism of second quantization to strongly correlated many-body systems, such as delocalised electrons in a metal. In such a situation, the electrons can be thought of to a (very crude) rst approximation as being uniformly spread-out across the crystal lattice of the solid. It is then possible to analyse the behaviour of this uniform`sea' of electrons in terms of a superposition of`electron waves', each characterised by a unique wave vector k (as well as a spin variable σ). One may then describe changes in the system, for example an energy excitation caused by a perturbation of the system, in terms of the creation and annihilation of new electron waves adding and removing contributions to the superposition. In quantum mechanics, these processes are described by operators acting on the many-body quantum state of the system.
It is these operators that, for obvious reasons, are known as creation and annihilation operators, and are symbolized byâ † k,σ andα k,σ , respectively. This mathematical description of the dierent components of the electron system stresses the collective nature of its dynamics.
14 As representations of fermions (spin-1/2 particles such as electrons), the operators must satisfy certain anticommutation relations in order to satisfy the basic constraints of fundamental theory.
So far, I have only indicated which mathematical framework in this case, operator algebra the formalism draws on, and how its symbolic conventions are to be understood. However, for a physically interpreted mathematical formalism to emerge, it is necessary that certain theoretical, or other (e.g., methodological), 14 Thanks to the regularity of the crystal lattice, however, one can perform a (discrete)
Fourier transformation, which maps the representation back onto individual electrons associated with lattice sites. Hence, even though the electrons are delocalised, we may nonetheless speak of the creation (â † i,σ ) and annihilation (â i,σ ) of an electron of spin σ associated with lattice site i.
It is crucial, then, that a formalism provides both additional constraints and sucient exibility to allow for its application to dierent target systems. By constraining the process of inquiry without tailoring it to any one empirical situation in particular, the choice of mathematical formalism may itself play an important heuristic role, for example in strategies of model-building.
As an example of the constraining role of mathematical formalism, I wish to discuss the case of the conservation of particle number in quantum many-body systems. Condensed matter physicists know on independent grounds that, in the systems they are trying to model, particles (=electrons) cannot simply be annihilated completely or created out of nothing (at least not by the mechanisms that govern the dynamics in a solid at room temperature). However, nothing in the mathematics of operator algebra per se rules out the possibility of varying particle number. Indeed, if one looked in isolation at how creation and annihilation operators are mathematically dened, then, on the standard interpretation of quantum operators, their net eect would be such that, considered individually, they would seem to describe states where an individual electron has been created from nothing, or destroyed without trace, thereby violating conservation of particle number. It is, of course, clear that any mathematical approach that could not account for the fact of particle conservation at low energies would be of little representational value for the description of real, existing many-body systems. However, the mathematical formalism of creation and annihilation operators goes beyond the mere mathematical denition of the operators themselves, in that it also includes heuristic rules for the deployment of such operators. One such rule states that creation and annihilation operators can never occur individually in the equations of our mathematical model, but only in pairs. This way, an electron that is`annihilated' at one point in the system will be simultaneously`recreated' at a dierent point in the system, and at no point is there a violation of particle number. Because the mathematical formalism does not include a variable for time, there is no`time lag' (so to speak) between the removal of an electron at one place and the addition of another electron at a dierent place in the system. Despite of the lack of a temporal dimension, physicists nonetheless choose to give a dynamic interpretation to the eect of the joint application of an annihilation and a creation operator (never mind the absence of a dynamic component from the model): they claim perhaps: pretend that what is`being modelled' is the movement of an electron from the place where it was`annihilated' to the place where it was (re-)`created'. The idea that models need to be`moulded' to t specic empirical contexts coheres well with other approaches that draw their inspiration from case studies of actual scientic practice. Thus Margaret Morrison, in a contribution to the same volume that contains Boumans' 1999 paper, argues that`model construction involves a complex activity of integration' [Morrison 1999, p. 44] ;
like Boumans, she elsewhere emphasises that`the proof or legitimacy of the representation arises as a result of the model's performance in experimental, engineering and other kinds of interventionist contexts' [Morrison 1998, p. 81] .
A similar sentiment is expressed by Suárez when he writes that models are`inherently intended for specic phenomena' [Suárez 1999, p. 75] . What these remarks indicate is that models are frequently employed in specic (often explanatory) contexts, when a phenomenon cannot be adequately described, or an elaboration not only of how mathematics provides ways of tting a given model to a specic empirical situation, but also of how it enables some models perhaps even the majority of mathematical models to represent an entire class of phenomena, and sometimes dierent such classes altogether. Mathematical formalisms are an obvious candidate for providing the requisite balance between specicity and generality.
Let us turn to the second contrast case, which, for want of a better designation, I shall refer to as`the structuralist approach'. I here have in mind a cluster of proposals, all of which attempt to make sense of the role of mathematics in physics, and of the relation between theories and the kinds of models actually used by scientists, in terms of an embedding of an already mathematised theory T into a mathematical structure M. This embedding is construed in settheoretic terms, by positing the existence of a suitable homomorphism between T and M. Typically, according to the structuralist proposal, this will take the form of an isomorphism that maps T onto a substructure µ of M. Introducing a formal calculus, on which T and µ are taken to be isomorphic models, and assuming a way to patch this calculus up with the semantic resources for M, then allows one to properly regard T as embedded into a larger structure most importantly, one that contains`surplus structure' (given that M is to be understood as an extension of µ). [Redhead 1975, p. 87] What renders this picture attractive, for the present argument, is its ability to make plausible how mathematics more specically: the`surplus' mathematical structure that is made available by embedding a theoretical structure into a larger mathematical framework may be of heuristic value, insofar as new mathematical resources become available that may eventually suggest new theoretical developments.
The structuralist approach has since been extended and rened, most recently through the inuential`partial structures' programme (for a review and defence, see [da Costa and French 2003] ). Such renements are partly a response to claims that a structuralist account (of the general kind sketched above) is unable to account for the diversity of the kinds of models including analogies, iconic models, material models that scientists actually deploy in their everyday work. One move has been to relax some of the requirements of earlier structuralist accounts, for example by demanding only partial identity between models and situations and by allowing partial isomorphisms to take the place of full isomorphisms. Some critics, however, have argued that, while partial structures and partial isomorphisms bring greater exibility, they also are in`danger of trivializing our representational relationships' [Pincock 2005b [Pincock , p. 1254 ; in response, proponents of the partial structures approach have suggested that it may be possible to appeal to heuristic factors in order to explain why one model (or one partial isomorphism) rather than another was adopted. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the overall merits of either the`partial structures' approach or the criticism that has been levelled against the structuralist approach more generally; instead, I want to argue that, irrespective of whether such an approach can be successfully defended, relations between abstract structures do not exhaust the role of mathematics in the construction of scientic models.
Even if one grants that there are no in-principle obstacles to giving a reconstruction of models and theories in terms of relations between abstract structures, such an approach misses an important dimension of the model-building process. The`hands-on' character of applying a mature mathematical formalism in order to represent phenomena and physical systems seems strangely absent from the world of relations between abstract structures. We should not be tempted to reify structure as something attributed in our descriptions: to consider a thing under an abstract (or structural) description is neither to think of it as an abstract object, nor to think of it as something that bears a structural relation to one.
Embedded in theories, mathematical equations can be used to make sophisticated and abstract claims about real physical systems; the representational cash value of mathematics, within science, must lie in the truth-conditions of the claims it can be used to make about them. [Hendry and Psillos 2007, p. 145] .
While I shall not take issue with the structuralist approach as far as it goes, I believe that the quote from Hendry and Psillos conveys a justied sense of dissatisfaction, insofar as the focus on mere structures and their relations obscures the value of mathematics as something that is used, in specic ways that are underdetermined by any structuralist account, in order to represent specic physical phenomena and (classes of ) physical systems. Mature mathematical formalisms in physics, by contrast, typically include (often heuristic) rules and strategies for modelling relevant aspects of phenomena and systems that fall within the domain for which the formalism has been devised.
As I suggested at the beginning of this section, my goal in considering mathematical moulding and the structuralist approach as contrast cases to mathematical formalism was not to argue for any incompatibility between the latter and either of the former two. Rather, I intended to situate mathematical formalism as an integral part of model-building between the two. For, as I hope to have made plausible, mathematical moulding and the structuralist approach lie at opposite ends of a whole spectrum of conceptions of how mathematics applies to the world. Loosely speaking, whereas mathematical moulding accounts for the local tting, or`ne-tuning', of a model to specic empirical contexts, the structuralist account takes a global account of how theories and models can be embedded in`mathematics-at-large', without necessarily much concern for specic features of a given model beyond its`embeddability', as it were. Both the the many-body system to be described. Certain combinations of operators can be immediately ruled out as`unphysical', simply on the basis that they can be seen to violate basic constraints, such as conservation of particle number, which are thought to govern the target system. Often, such determinations can be made without recourse to elaborate derivations from theoretical rst principles, but are enshrined in the notational conventions deployed by the formalism itself. (As a primitive analogy, consider how one might be able to spot a severe mistake in a mathematical derivation by checking that certain notational rules e.g., regarding signs or the use of parentheses were violated.) Importantly, the conventions of a particular mature mathematical formalism in a given scientic context, such as the creation/annihilation operator formalism in quantum many-body physics, add to, and are not merely the same as, the conventions of mathematics-at-large; for example, they might encompass locally applicable rules for the manipulation of the relevant mathematical symbols, where these rules are derived from, or otherwise systematically connected to, certain theoretical or methodological commitments. Examples of theoretical commitments that may be enshrined in a mature formalism would be certain fundamental laws of nature that are thought to govern the behaviour of the target system (and which one wants any model of that system to reect), or an ontological commitment to the kinds of theoretical entities that a model may include as relevant. A mature mathematical formalism, one might say, embodies theoretical constraints and relationships in much the same way as, say, an orrery embodies the dynamics of the planetary system it represents (see the discussion at the end of Section 3.3.).
17 The way in which certain constraints are incorporated into a formalism need not always be explicit; many mature formalisms involve an element of`self-regulating conventionality', where such conventionality`is not the result of any explicit attempt to conventionalise a practice', but arises from successive applications, for specic representational goals, in a way that is role of mathematical formalism when he writes that`a mathematical formalism is sought that is able to generate the relevant characteristics of the phenomena that should be explained or described ' [Boumans 2005, p. 58, italics added] . However, mathematical formalism is still understood as`one of the ingredients that should be integrated' (ibid., p. 17), rather than as an integrating force itself.
17 While this is, of course, only an analogy, philosophers of mathematics, too, have recognised the parallels between mathematics and activities and phenomena in the material world. Thus, Imre Lakatos writes:`Mathematics, this product of human activity, alienates itself from the human activity which has been producing it. It becomes a living, growing organism, that acquires a certain autonomy from the activity which has produced it; it develops its own autonomous laws of growth, its own dialectic.' [Lakatos 1976, p. 146] `self-perpetuating and in need of no explicit, external introduction' [Netz 1999, p. 78f.] .
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Mature formalisms of the sort discussed here are not conned to, and indeed will usually go beyond, the notational devices standardly used in pure mathematics. In physics, especially, one nds many examples of formalisms that straddle the boundary between the mathematical and the merely diagrammatic. Some of these, such as Dirac's`bra-ket' notation in quantum theory, which describes quantum states using angle brackets and vertical bars as nota- 
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The gradual evolution from mere shorthands to powerful heuristic devices and theoretical tools, is characteristic of mature mathematical formalisms. As they undergo a process of elaboration, enrichment, and entrenchment, mature formalisms come to embody theoretical, ontological, and methodological commitments and assumptions; since these are enshrined in the formalism itself either in that the formalism allows only for some, but not all, possible processes and mechanisms to be represented, or because their theoretical character is cloaked behind purely notational rules they are no longer readily obvious to either the novice or the procient user. At the same time as formalisms constrain what may be represented (and how), they also function as inferential and interpretative resources.
20 While the rules governing, say, creation and annihilation operators shape how a many-body theorist will typically go about modelling complex phenomena, e.g. in the form of simple additive contributions to the overall Hamiltonian, they also often suggest`concrete' interpretations of individual terms (as in the`hopping' of electrons from one lattice site to another, discussed in Section 4.2.). It bears repeating that a mature mathematical formalism (in the sense discussed here) even though it may aord its user considerable latitude in concrete applications is infused with theoretical commitments, which determine, at least in part, which physically meaningful interpretations of a specic application are legitimate. This is precisely what makes mature formalisms so convenient to their users, who would otherwise have to settle on one amongst a plethora of prima facie permissible interpretations. Mature mathematical formalisms, thus, provide a crucial link between the realm of`unconstrained' mathematics and the theoretical conception (or scientic image') of the physical domain of which the target system is a part.
Michael Polanyi, in a dierent context, has commented on the dual character of mathematical formalism as both constraining and enabling, as well as on its role as a provider of access to inferential resources. On the one hand, Polanyi writes:
The process of reorganizing a conception for drawing new inferences from it can be formalized, by accepting as inferential operations certain rules for manipulating the symbols representing the states of aairs. [Polanyi 1962, p. 117] On the other hand, routine formalization and acceptance of notational rules associated with formalisms, may well be a precondition for systematic inquiry into novel phenomena and explanations, since once it has been established,`a mathematical formalism may be operated in ever new, uncovenanted ways, and force on our hesitant minds the expression of a novel conception'. [Polanyi 1962, p . 104] Mathematical formalisms, thus, not only occupy an interesting middle ground between`global' ways of mathematically mapping the world-at-large and local' cases of mathematical moulding in concrete empirical contexts; they also play a vital role in allowing us to go beyond routine methods, by constructing new representational devices, thereby extending the reach of our representational practices to ever new domains.
